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Same-Sex Marriage and the 
“Reconceiving” of Children 
Helen M. Alvaré† 
Abstract 
Historically, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently highlighted 
the importance of procreation in its consideration of marriage in 
constitutional cases. Recently, however, litigants seeking same-sex 
marriage and judicial decisions sympathetic to their arguments have 
ignored the language and holdings of this long-standing body of law. 
Instead, they have focused nearly entirely upon adults’ interests in 
state marriage recognition. To the extent children are mentioned, it is 
for the purpose of speculating that children living within same-sex 
marriage households might indirectly benefit from recognition of 
adults’ rights to same-sex marriage. 
This Article discusses the importance of states’ interests in 
procreation and child rearing and the Supreme Court’s constant 
recognition of those interests. Ultimately, this Article argues that 
judicial decisions recognizing same-sex marriage have marginalized, or 
“reconceived,” the role of children in marriage, in several important 
ways, all to the marked disadvantage of children. 
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Introduction  
This Article argues that judicial opinions creating same-sex 
marriage rights “reconceive” constitutional family law’s longstanding 
and basic grasp of the relationships between marriage and children 
and between parents and children. Any observer might perceive the 
most obvious elements of this shift: the birth of children is no longer 
an important part of states’ interests in recognizing marriage. 
Moreover, states do not express a preference for facilitating or 
preserving children’s embeddedness within a family composed of their 
kin—biological mother or father or siblings or extended family. These 
positions represent dramatic reversals of 120 years of constitutional 
family law decisions issuing from the United States Supreme Court.  
Read carefully, however, both state and federal same-sex marriage 
opinions also communicate a great deal more concerning the situation 
and future of children within both society and family law. They 
perceptibly tilt the balance of responsibility for children away from 
the adults who are rearing them, in favor of the state and society. 
Further, by blessing and paving the way for more child rearing in 
homes led by same-sex couples, they shift the meaning of children to 
themselves and to others, away from notions like “gift” and “kin,” 
and toward notions such as “choice” or “object of desire.” They also 
shift the environment for children away from relationship and toward 
separation. This Article addresses each of these shifts as follows.  
Part I presents representative same-sex marriage cases’ reversal of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s longstanding position that state marriage 
recognition is importantly associated with procreation. It also 
considers such cases’ ignoring or disclaiming states’ interests in the 
goods that married, biological parents bring to their children.  
Part II discusses the shift in the paradigm heretofore governing 
adults’ legal rights respecting children. In prior constitutional family 
law, when adults sought rights in conflict with customs or laws 
designed to protect children’s best interests, the Supreme Court asked 
first if the adults’ duties to children would be fulfilled by the adults’ 
exercise of their claimed rights. Opinions approving same-sex 
marriage, on the other hand, devote either no attention, or shallow or 
uninformed attention, to the matter of adults’ duties to children, 
despite the fact that same-sex marriage recognition will facilitate a 
host of rights for adults respecting children.  
Part II also highlights a second change that same-sex marriage 
recognition brings about respecting adults’ rights over children. While 
prior Supreme Court decisions presumed that children’s welfare was a 
direct product of adults’ satisfaction of their duties toward children, 
cases approving same-sex marriage speculate that children will benefit 
only indirectly from the state’s granting of rights (marriage 
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recognition) to adults. This conclusion flows from a presumption often 
appearing in same-sex marriage opinions: if there is suffering 
experienced by children living in same-sex partner households, it is 
due to governmental and social mistreatment of the partners or 
household, not the family structure; therefore, granting rights to the 
adult partners will cause outsiders to treat the family better and 
create trickle-down economic and social benefits for the children in 
the household. In short, outsiders are assigned more of the 
responsibility for children’s welfare, while the adults rearing them are 
assigned less responsibility, as compared with prior relevant law.  
Part III critiques same-sex marriage opinions’ short-circuiting of 
the inquiry into the welfare of children in same-sex households just as 
it is commencing in earnest. It also explores some potential effects of 
casting children into existential environments that portend difficulties 
for children and for the larger society.  
I. The Disappearance of Children and Kinship from 
the Goods of Marriage 
United States Supreme Court decisions from the early nineteenth 
to the late twentieth century repeatedly recognized with approval 
states’ interests in the procreative features of marriage: child birth 
and child rearing by the adults who conceived them. This Part 
considers those decisions and, thereafter, representative same-sex 
marriage cases’ reversal of the Court’s position.  
A. Procreation 
1. Historical Marriage Rights and a Reliance on Procreation 
As detailed in this Part, the Court has written a great deal on the 
nature of the states’ interests in marriage in the context of evaluating 
state laws affecting entry into or exit from marriage or concerning 
parental rights and obligations. Typically, the Court has recognized 
that states are vitally interested in marriage, not only because it 
benefits adults but also because it offers distinct advantages to 
children and to the larger society. Regarding society’s interests, the 
Court has noted bluntly that children create society. It has not placed 
special weight on adults’ interests in marriage, nor has it vaulted the 
interests of limited categories of children over the interests of all 
children generally. This is not to deny that states value adults’ 
interests in marriage nor that prior constitutional family law has 
acknowledged these interests—including adult happiness, mutual 
commitment, increased stability, and social esteem. It is only to say 
that pre-Windsor constitutional law concerning marriage is not at all 
adult-centric, as distinguished from Windsor itself and state law cases 
recognizing  
same-sex marriage. 
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While it is difficult to disentangle completely the Court’s language 
affirming states’ interests in the birth of children from their interests 
in the healthy formation of children within marriage, it is possible to 
discern the former from a close analysis of the relevant cases. For 
example, in Reynolds v. United States,1 rejecting a Free Exercise claim 
on behalf of polygamy,2 the Supreme Court explained states’ interests 
in regulating marriage with this simple declaration: “Upon [marriage] 
society may be said to be built . . . .”3 This statement necessarily 
implies that marriage is inextricably linked to procreation, the means 
by which society is generated. Nearly 100 years later, in Loving v. 
Virginia,4 in an opinion striking down Virginia’s antimiscegenation 
law,5 the Court referred to marriage as “fundamental to our very 
existence and survival”6—again clearly recognizing the role of 
marriage in propagating society through childbearing. 
Even in cases where only marriage or only childbearing was at 
issue, the Court consistently referred to the concepts of marriage and 
childbirth together in the same phrase, nearly axiomatically. The 
following cases illustrate: In Meyer v. Nebraska,7 which vindicated 
parents’ constitutional rights to have their children instructed in a 
foreign language,8 the Court referred not merely to parents’ rights to 
care for children but to citizens’ rights “to marry, establish a home 
and bring up children.”9 In Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,10 
concerning a law that imposed forced sterilization on certain felons,11 
the Court opined that “[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to 
the very existence and survival of the race.”12  
In Zablocki v. Redhail,13 which struck down a Wisconsin law 
restricting marriage for certain child support debtors,14 the Court 
 
1. 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
2. Id. at 166–67.  
3. Id. at 165. 
4. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
5. Id. at 2.  
6. Id. at 12 (rejecting Virginia’s law as violative of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
7. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
8. Id. at 400–03.  
9. Id. at 399. 
10. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
11. Id. at 536–37.  
12. Id. at 541. 
13. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
14. Id. at 375–77.  
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wrote that “it would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy 
with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to 
the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the 
family in our society.”15 As in Loving, the Zablocki Court reiterated 
that marriage is “fundamental to our very existence and survival”16 
and recognized additionally the right to “deci[de] to marry and raise 
the child in a traditional family setting.”17  
The 1977 opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,18 
announcing a blood-and-marriage-related family’s constitutional right 
to co-reside,19 referenced the procreative aspect of family life, stating 
that “the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and 
pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”20  
Similarly, in Parham v. J.R.,21 a case about parents’ rights to 
direct their children’s health care,22 the Court stated that “[o]ur 
jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts 
of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor 
children.”23  
Thus, from Reynolds in 1879 to Parham in 1979, the Court 
sounded the theme that state marriage recognition is closely tied to 
the state’s interest in procreation. The arguments and judicial 
opinions favoring same-sex marriage, on the other hand, ignore or 
excise the Supreme Court’s language linking marriage with 
procreation. To these I now turn. 
2. Same-Sex Marriage Proponents Divorce  
Marriage and Procreation 
The view of marriage advocated by same-sex marriage 
proponents—and adopted in recent state and federal cases creating 
same-sex marriage—rejects states’ linking their interests in marriage 
with their interests in children. This Part considers representative 
litigants’ arguments about the meaning of marriage found in the  
15. Id. at 386. 
16. Id. at 383 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
17. Id. at 386. 
18. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
19. Id. at 506 (holding unconstitutional a city ordinance that narrowly 
defined “family” and prevented a woman from lawfully living with her 
biological grandchildren).  
20. Id. at 503–04 (footnote omitted). 
21. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
22. Id. at 587.  
23. Id. at 602. 
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briefs filed for United States v. Windsor24 and Hollingsworth v. 
Perry,25 the most recent Supreme Court cases concerning same-sex 
marriage. It also discusses the arguments about the meaning of 
marriage in the landmark Massachusetts case Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health.26  
Turning first to legal arguments offered by same-sex marriage 
proponents in Windsor and Hollingsworth, one notices immediately 
that these proponents took great pains to excise references to children 
when quoting the Supreme Court’s prior family law opinions. In their 
complaint27 and trial memorandum28 in the challenge to California’s 
Proposition 8,29 for example, plaintiff same-sex couples selectively 
quoted from Loving only the language about marriage as a “basic civil 
right[ ]”30 of adults, or a “vital personal right[ ] essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men.”31 They excised Loving’s 
immediately adjoining reference to marriage as the foundation of 
society,32 language that links state interest in marriage with 
procreation. These plaintiffs similarly quoted Cleveland Board of 
Education v. La Fleur33 without noting that the central freedom at 
issue there involved a married teacher “deciding to bear a child.”34  
Perhaps the most egregious example of the Perry plaintiffs’ 
attempt to erase children from marriage was their misuse of Turner v. 
 
24. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
25. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).  
26. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
27. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief, Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-2292-
VRW) [hereinafter Compl.]. 
28. Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiff-Intervenor’s Trial Memorandum, Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-2292-
VRW) [hereinafter Trial Mem.]. 
29. California Marriage Protection Act, approved by voter referendum 
Nov. 4, 2008 (codified at Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5). 
30.  Compl., supra note 27, at 1, 7. 
31. Trial Mem., supra note 28, at 3. 
32. The full language from Loving is that marriage is “fundamental to our 
very existence and survival.” Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
33. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
34. Compare Trial Mem., supra note 28, at 3–4 (discussing “‘freedom of 
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life’” (quoting 
Cleveland, 414 U.S. at 639)), with Cleveland, 414 U.S. at 640 (stating 
further that one has a “right ‘to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into . . . the decision whether to bear or beget a child’” and 
discussing the mandatory maternity leave rules at issue (quoting 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972))). 
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Safley,35 a case in which the Supreme Court held that a near ban on 
inmates’ ability to marry was facially invalid.36 The Perry plaintiffs 
cited Turner for the proposition that civil marriage is an 
“‘expression[ ] of emotional support and public commitment,’ an 
exercise in spiritual unity, and a fulfillment of one’s self.”37 The 
district court’s opinion in Perry v. Schwarzenegger38—an advocacy 
document in its own right—did likewise, selectively quoting only the 
adult-related aspects of the Court’s statements about the meaning of 
marriage and deliberately cutting out references to procreation.39 But 
in Turner, the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged in two ways 
states’ interests linking procreation with marriage recognition. First, 
Turner concluded that while adults’ interests constituted “elements” 
or a “significant aspect” of marriage, marriage possessed other 
“incidents” that prisoners would eventually realize.40 The Court then 
referred specifically to consummation:41 heterosexual intercourse with 
a spouse. 
Second, Turner distinguished the situation of the prisoners before 
the Court—who would someday be free—from the situation of 
prisoners sentenced for life; it acknowledged that the state could 
legitimately refuse to permit marriage by those imprisoned for life if 
denial of the right to marry was imposed as part of the penalty for 
the crime committed.42 The Turner Court implied that marriage could 
be denied to those imprisoned for life by noting that the Supreme 
Court had summarily affirmed43 the case of Johnson v. Rockefeller,44 
in which inmates imprisoned for life were validly denied marriage.45 In 
Johnson, the Southern District of New York reasoned that the 
 
35. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
36. Id. at 99. 
37. Trial Mem., supra note 28, at 6 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 95–96). 
38. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
39. Compare Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 991 (“‘[T]he decision to 
marry is a fundamental right’ and marriage is an ‘expression[ ] of 
emotional support and public commitment.’” (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. 
at 95)), with Turner, 482 U.S. at 96 (noting inmates’ expectation to 
consummate their marriages upon release and the benefit marriage offers in 
legitimizing “children born out of wedlock”). 
40. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987). 
41. Id. at 96. 
42. Turner, 482 U.S. at 96. 
43. Id. (citing Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953 (1974)). 
44. 365 F. Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
45. Id. at 380 (holding that an inmate could be deprived of the right to 
marry, along with other liberties, as punishment for a crime).  
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inmates under consideration would not have the opportunity to 
procreate or rear children. The Johnson Court said the following:  
In actuality the effect of the statute [denying marriage] is to 
deny to Butler only the right to go through the formal 
ceremony of marriage. Those aspects of marriage which make it 
“one of the ‘basic civil rights of man’”—cohabitation, sexual 
intercourse, and the begetting and raising of children—are 
unavailable to those in Butler’s situation because of the fact of 
their incarceration.46 
Similarly, the Windsor respondent, in challenging the federal 
government’s decision to recognize same-sex marriages granted in a 
few states,47 provided a lengthy discussion of the Equal Protection 
Clause without mentioning the governmental interest in encouraging 
procreation through marriage.48 The respondent asserted, rather, that 
the federal government’s position was simply irrational, even hateful.49 
The Windsor majority accepted this position, ignoring over a century 
of prior marriage cases highlighting procreation and holding that the 
federal refusal to recognize the same-sex marriages before the Court 
had the “purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom 
the State . . . sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”50 
The plaintiffs in the Massachusetts same-sex marriage case, 
Goodridge, likewise excised children from the constitutional law of 
marriage, stating that marriage recognition would take away a social 
“badge of inferiority” and instead “instantly” communicate “their 
relationship . . . to third parties.”51 The Massachusetts Supreme Court 
opinion hewed closely to the plaintiffs’ arguments, excising children 
from its references to Zablocki, Loving, and Skinner and misusing 
Turner similarly.52 
 
46. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
47. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. 2675 (2013). 
48. See Brief on the Merits for Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 14–62, 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (Feb. 26, 2013) (12-307), 
2013 WL 701228. 
49. Id. at 32–59. 
50. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696. 
51. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment 
at 19, Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, No. 01-1647-A (Mass. Super. 
Ct. 2002). 
52. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 957, 966 (Mass. 
2003) (citing Zablocki, Loving, Skinner, and Turner for the proposition 
that the freedom to marry is a constitutionally protected right). 
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3. Judicial Decisions Minimalizing the States’ Interest in Procreation 
 This Part considers the ways in which judicial opinions 
recognizing same-sex marriage have ignored or cast aside the historic 
constitutional link between marriage rights and procreation. It first 
considers representative state court opinions and, thereafter, Windsor. 
a. Pre-Windsor State Court Opinions 
Turning to pre-Windsor judicial opinions creating same-sex 
marriage, one notices several aspects that minimize or even ignore 
children. First, these opinions devote the lion’s share of attention to 
adults, a matter of record that has been well documented previously.53 
Second, the entire subject of children is never raised on the state 
supreme courts’ own initiative but only in response to defendants’ 
claims that procreation is an important state interest in opposite-sex 
marriage. Responding to this claim, state courts take up the matter of 
children, at which point they insist that prior state decisions about 
marriage and about childbearing or child rearing indicate a lack of 
interest in marital procreation. 
 All of the leading state supreme court decisions recognizing same-
sex marriage, for example, find it highly significant that states do not 
have a procreation condition for the granting of state marriage 
licenses.54 In order to assume that this connotes a lack of interest in 
procreation on the part of the state, however, such opinions have to 
ignore the obvious privacy concerns associated with widespread 
premarital fertility testing, or the potential for married couples to 
change their minds, or the fact that, today, over eighty percent of 
opposite-sex couples in the United States become parents during  
their marriage.55  
State court opinions creating same-sex marriage also dwell on the 
variety of ways in which states show themselves willing to allow 
children to be reared outside marriage or by homosexual individuals 
or couples.56 But as Part I.B considers, these observations do not 
 
53. See, e.g., Helen M. Alvaré, The Turn Toward the Self in the Law of 
Marriage & Family: Same-Sex Marriage & Its Predecessors, 16 Stan. 
L. & Pol’y Rev. 135, 171–82 (2005). 
54. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 902 (Iowa 2009); 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003). 
55. Fertility of American Women: Women by Reporting Status on Children 
Ever Born, by Race, Hispanic Origin, Nativity Status, and Selected 
Characteristics: June 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
hhes/fertility/files/cps/2010/table4-10-allraces.xls (last visited Mar. 11, 
2014) (reporting that nineteen percent of married women between the 
ages of fifteen and forty-four reported themselves as childless in 2010). 
56. For a summary of such state court recitations, see Alvaré, supra 
note 53, at 165, 168–71. 
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effectively undercut the existence of a state interest in linking 
marriage with procreation. 
Thereafter, these opinions focus nearly exclusively on identifying 
adult-centered meanings of marriage. In Goodridge, for example, the 
Massachusetts court concluded that it is the “exclusive and 
permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one another, not 
the begetting of children, that is the sine qua non of civil marriage.”57 
In the Vermont Supreme Court’s Baker v. State,58 the court described 
marriage as “state-sanctioned human relations” and an “avowed 
commitment to an intimate and lasting human relationship.”59  
b. Windsor 
Turning now to the Supreme Court’s Windsor opinion, one 
observes that it is quite similar to earlier state court same-sex 
marriage recognition cases, but it is even more single-mindedly 
focused on adults’ interests. When children are mentioned, it is only 
those children presently living in households with adult same-sex 
partners, whose situation is considered from the perspective of how 
they would be affected by granting rights to the adults in the home.60 
State courts and the Windsor Court assume without citing any expert 
sources that this discrete group of children will gain social regard and 
government benefits when the same-sex adult pair in their household 
is permitted legal marriage. The Windsor majority claimed, for 
example, that state marriage recognition highlights for observers the 
“integrity and closeness” of the household of children living with two 
adults of the same sex, as well as their “concord with other families in 
their community” and “concord with other families . . . in their daily 
lives.”61  
It must be noted here, however, that neither Windsor nor state 
same-sex marriage opinions acknowledge that the vast majority of the 
children living in same-sex partner households are unlikely to be 
affected by same-sex marriage recognition in the ways the courts 
speculate, for the simple reason—never mentioned by any of the 
courts—that these children are usually (in 86% of cases) the offspring 
of a prior heterosexual relationship involving one of the adults in the 
same-sex household.62 Consequently, the child usually already has two  
57. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003). 
58.  744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
59. Id. at 889.  
60. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) 
(indicating that the law’s differentiation “humiliates tens of thousands 
of children now being raised by same-sex couples”). 
61. Id.  
62. See Mark Regnerus, How Different Are the Adult Children of Parents 
Who Have Same-Sex Relationships? Findings from the New Family 
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legally recognized parents—both a biological mother and father—and 
the law’s failure to recognize same-sex marriage will not change their 
legal family relationships in any way.  
Although Windsor devoted little attention to children when it 
considered adults’ interests in marriage, it did evaluate adults’ 
interests at length and with the use of notably emotional language. 
The Court called marriage a means for two people to “define 
themselves by their commitment to each other,”63 and a way the 
public “affirm[s] their commitment” to one another.64 Marriage was 
also characterized as a tool for achieving equality for same-sex 
partnerships, allowing “two persons of the same sex [to] aspire to 
occupy the same status and dignity as that of a man and woman in 
lawful marriage.”65 It is a path to pride in oneself individually and to 
pride in one’s partnership with one other person, and toward living in 
and being seen to live in a partnership equal to that between 
opposite-sex people.66 The court added that marriage is a vehicle for 
same-sex couples to “enhance their own liberty”67 and achieve 
“protection[ ],”68 for conferring “dignity” and a “status of immense 
import,”69 and for marking “personhood.”70 Finally, the Court declared 
 
Structures Study, 41 SOC. SCI. RES. 752, 756–57 (2012) (providing that 
“a failed heterosexual union is clearly the modal method” by which 
same-sex couples become parents); see also Gary J. Gates, Family 
Formation and Raising Children Among Same-Sex Couples, Nat’l 
Council on Fam. Rel.: FAMILY FOCUS, Winter 2011, at F1 
[hereinafter Gates, Family Formation] (“[One research study] suggest[s] 
that offspring of lesbian and gay parents are more often the product of 
different-sex relationships that occur before individuals are open about 
their sexual orientation.”); GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST., LGBT 
PARENTING IN THE UNITED STATES (2013) (providing a statistical 
summary of the demographics of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT) households); Ronald Bailey, The Science on Same Sex 
Marriage, The REASON FOUND. (April 15, 2013), http://www.reason.
com/archives/2013/04/05/the-science-on-same-sex-marriage (“Nearly 
20 percent of same-sex households . . . reported having children, and 
84 percent contained children biologically related to one of the 
householders.”).  
63. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689.  
64. Id.  
65. Id. 
66. Id.  
67. Id. at 2695. 
68. Id. at 2690. 
69. Id. at 2692.  
70. Id. at 2696.  
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that same-same marriage is a way for the law to acknowledge the 
“intimate relationship between two people.”71 
This review of arguments advanced by proponents of same-sex 
marriage, as well as the arguments adopted by state courts and the 
U.S. Supreme Court, demonstrates clearly that same-sex marriage 
recognition advances the disappearance of children from an area of 
family law—marriage—previously highly attentive to children. This is 
significant not only because it is contrary to prior law but also 
because marriage was effectively the last remaining facet of family law 
concerned with preserving children’s stable links with the adults 
conceiving and rearing them. As Part III notes, the other leading 
areas of family law that once served this purpose are gone.  
B. Kinship and Biological Child Rearing  
This Part considers a second distinction between prior Supreme 
Court family law precedents and same-sex marriage recognition cases. 
A prominent theme in the Supreme Court’s prior marriage cases is 
the unique importance of the family unit and bonds among kin 
originating in marriage. A leading feature of this material is the 
Court’s discussion of the possibility that blood or natural 
relationships contribute to parents’ dedication and success in forming 
their children. Same-sex marriage recognition cases, however, 
regularly ignore or disclaim this feature of prior constitutional cases.  
In cases in which natural parents’ interests in directing children’s 
upbringing conflicted with others’ claims about child welfare, the pre-
Windsor Supreme Court approvingly noted the significance of the 
bond between parents and their natural children. This is found in 
Parham, when the Court observed that states presume that “natural 
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their 
children.”72 Similar statements were made in Smith v. Organization of 
Foster Families for Equality and Reform73 and in the grandparents’ 
rights case of Troxel v. Granville.74 
In 1977, the Smith Court refused to extend equal parenting rights 
to foster parents, writing about the relationships between family life 
and the good of children and the larger society:  
 
 
71. Id. at 2692. 
72. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (citing 1 William 
Blackstone, Commentaries *447; 2 James Kent, Commentaries 
on American Law *190). 
73. 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (“‘It is cardinal with us that the custody, care, 
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents . . . .’” (quoting 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944))). 
74.  530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (“[T]here is a presumption that fit parents act in 
the best interests of their children.”). 
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Thus the importance of the familial relationship, to the 
individuals involved and to the society, stems from the 
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily 
association, and from the role it plays in “promot[ing] a way of 
life” through the instruction of children, as well as from the fact 
of blood relationship.75  
 
One final case stressing the significance of kin relations in promoting 
children’s well-being is Moore v. City of East Cleveland.76 There, the 
Supreme Court considered a local zoning ordinance that would have 
forced an extended family to live in separate residences.77 The  
majority wrote:  
 
Decisions concerning child rearing, which Yoder, Meyer, Pierce and 
other cases have recognized as entitled to constitutional protection, 
long have been shared with grandparents or other relatives who 
occupy the same household—indeed who may take on major 
responsibility for the rearing of the children. . . . Whether or not 
such a household is established because of personal tragedy, the 
choice of relatives in this degree of kinship to live together may not 
lightly be denied by the State.78 
In recent same-sex marriage opinions, by contrast, courts have 
ignored or explicitly denied the significance of child rearing within a 
naturally related family. I have considered this subject before,79 but a 
brief summary is appropriate here. State court opinions’ most 
frequent response to an argument about the good of biological 
parenting is to accuse the state of abandoning that goal at an earlier 
time, thus rendering suspect the state’s use of the argument to oppose 
same-sex marriage.80 The opinions highlight a variety of policies and 
situations that they claim reveal a state’s lack of interest in linking 
parents with their biological children or in ensuring heterosexual 
parenting: for example, giving custody of a child born to a 
heterosexual union to a parent who now identifies as homosexual;  
75. Smith, 431 U.S. at 844 (citation omitted). 
76.  431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
77. Id. at 495–96.  
78. Id. at 505–06 (citation and footnote omitted). 
79. See generally Alvaré, supra note 53, at 163–71 (discussing and 
responding to arguments adopted by courts ruling that marriage and 
procreation or child rearing are no longer linked state interests).  
80. Id. at 164–65 (citing Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 881–82 (Vt. 1999); 
Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *17 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 
Dec. 3, 1996); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 963–
64 (Mass. 2003)) 
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placing children for adoption with a homosexual individual; and 
allowing open access to assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs)—
both by homosexual and heterosexual individuals—for those seeking 
donor (unrelated) gametes.81  
None of these state policy decisions, however, are equivalent to a 
state disclaiming the importance of biological parenting. In the first 
scenario above—granting a now-homosexual parent custody of his or 
her child from a previous heterosexual union—is an affirmation of the 
importance of preserving biological parenting, not its denial.82 The 
second scenario—individual adoption by a homosexual—represents a 
decision made in the face of no possibility for biological parenting for 
that particular child.83 And the third scenario—the increasingly 
commonplace use of donor gametes by both homosexuals and 
heterosexuals—does not represent an exercise in state policy making 
because the legality of a market in gametes and embryos was not 
achieved by a “process of thorough deliberation by the people of a 
state or their representatives to the point where it can be said that 
the state has knowingly abandoned its interest in marital 
childbearing.”84 It is more accurate to acknowledge that these 
“[d]ecisions to allow such assisted procreation were [rather] initiated 
by individuals acting privately . . . and by fertility clinics and doctors 
who accepted the clients they chose, and who were not restrained by 
any law.”85  
In sum, none of these state decisions represent the deliberate 
execution of a state policy affirmatively expressing neutrality as 
between marital and nonmarital childbearing.  
As for the Supreme Court’s opinion in Windsor, it did not even 
broach the matter of the possible good of linking children with their 
genealogical inheritance. Further, although the Court claimed to rely 
on language from the official U.S. Congress House Report on the 
Defense of Marriage Act86 (“DOMA”) in order to claim that section 3 
of the Act87 rested on a “bare congressional desire to harm” 
 
81. Id.  
82. See id. at 168 (further elaborating this argument and citing cases 
allowing custody provided the “parent’s lifestyle is shown not likely to 
harm the child”).  
83. See id. at 169 (further elaborating this argument, citing other commentary, 
and discussing Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1992)). 
84. Id. at 170. 
85. Id. 
86. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) 
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)), 
invalidated in part by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
87. § 7, invalidated by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
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homosexuals,88 it completely ignored that report’s sustained attention 
to the goods of linking marriage with procreation and child rearing.89 
Instead, and as detailed in Part I.A.3.b, Windsor viewed marriage 
recognition as nearly exclusively concerned with vindicating  
adults’ interests. 
At the end of Part I, it is fair to conclude, upon a review of the 
Supreme Court’s pre-Windsor family law jurisprudence, that the 
Supreme Court has persistently and positively affirmed governmental 
interest in the procreational and child-rearing aspects of marriage, for 
the good of the children and of society. Same-sex marriage arguments 
and decisions, however, especially Windsor, deny or ignore the 
possible goods of procreation and child rearing by natural parents 
within marriage.  
II. Rights Before Duties? State Before Parents?  
This Part discusses the shift in the family law paradigm 
heretofore guiding adults’ legal rights respecting children in the 
context of new or uncertain circumstances. Previously, when adults 
wanted to make decisions about children in tension with custom or 
the law—about, for example, unmarried fathering, education or child 
labor laws, or children’s health—the Supreme Court always looked 
first to the matter of adults’ duties to children and then considered 
whether parents needed the requested rights in order to satisfy those 
duties. Opinions approving same-sex marriage, on the other hand, 
devote either no attention, shallow attention, or uninformed attention 
to the matter of parents’ duties to children. This is obviously 
problematic from a children’s rights perspective given how same-sex 
marriage recognition will open up a host of rights for same-sex 
partners respecting children. These rights are considered below.  
This Part also highlights another change that same-sex marriage 
cases have brought to the law governing parents’ rights respecting 
children. While prior Supreme Court decisions presumed that 
children’s welfare was a direct product of adults’ satisfaction of their 
duties toward children, cases approving same-sex marriage speculated 
that children will benefit indirectly from the state’s granting rights 
(i.e., marriage recognition) to the petitioning adults. A corollary of 
 
88. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. 
89. Compare id. at 2693 (quoting the report for the proposition that 
“interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages . . . was more 
than an incidental effect of the federal statute”), with H.R. REP. NO. 104-
664, at 13 (1996) (“At bottom, civil society has an interest in 
maintaining and protecting the institution of heterosexual marriage 
because it has a deep and abiding interest in encouraging responsible 
procreating and child-rearing. Simply put, government has an interest in 
marriage because it has an interest in children.”). 
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this move is the following: courts creating same-sex marriage often 
have remarked that the suffering experienced by children living in 
same-sex partner households is likely due not to family structure but 
to unfair governmental and social treatment of the unmarried same-
sex couple heading their household. The courts presumed, therefore, 
that granting marriage rights to this couple will cause trickle-down 
economic and social benefits for children. In short, outsiders (for 
example, the state and members of the community interacting with 
same-sex households) are assumed to bear relatively more 
responsibility for children’s welfare, while the adults rearing them are 
assigned relatively less responsibility.  
A. Parents’ Duties to Children 
For more than 100 years, the Supreme Court has generally 
assumed that parents have duties to prepare their children to be adult 
citizens in our democratic society. In Murphy v. Ramsey,90 for 
example, the Court opined: 
For certainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome 
and necessary in the founding of a free, self-governing 
commonwealth . . . than that which seeks to establish it on the 
basis of the idea of the family, as consisting in and springing 
from the union for life of one man and one woman in the holy 
estate of matrimony; the sure foundation of all that is stable 
and noble in our civilization; the best guaranty of that reverent 
morality which is the source of all beneficent progress in social 
and political improvement.91  
The 1888 decision of Maynard v. Hill92 referred to marriage as “having 
more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other 
institution,” and thus it was continually “subject to the control of the 
legislature.”93 And in the 1943 decision of Prince v. Massachusetts,94 
in the course of an opinion affirming parents’ authority over their 
children within the limits of child labor laws,95 the Court explicitly 
linked good child rearing practices to a healthy society, saying, “A 
democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy well-
rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all 
that implies.”96 In its 1983 “unmarried fathers’ rights” case Lehr v.  
90. 114 U.S. 15 (1885). 
91. Id. at 45. 
92. 125 U.S. 190 (1888). 
93. Id. at 205. 
94. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
95. Id. at 166. 
96. Id. at 168.  
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Robertson,97 the Supreme Court continued this theme when it 
described the marital family as playing a “critical role” in the 
formation of “democratic society.”98 
Justice Black’s dissent in Boddie v. Connecticut99—a case about 
the affordability of divorce process100—confirmed states’ particular 
interests in children in connection with both marriage formation and 
dissolution, writing, “The States provide for the stability of their 
social order, for the good morals of all their citizens, and for the needs 
of children from broken homes. The States, therefore, have particular 
interests in the kinds of laws regulating their citizens when they enter 
into, maintain, and dissolve marriages.”101  
The pattern in prior Supreme Court opinions is clear: when adults 
ask for rights respecting children in contested situations, the Court 
always looked first to the matter of adults’ duties to children and 
then considered whether granting adults the requested rights would 
capacitate them to fulfill their duties. Nor were the Court’s 
investigations into parents’ abilities to fulfill their duties simply pro 
forma. The material in Wisconsin v. Yoder102 is quite instructive in  
this regard. 
In Yoder, Amish families challenged a Wisconsin law mandating 
two additional years of education following elementary school.103 
Amish parents declared that they should have the right—both as a 
matter of their free exercise of religion and as a matter of their rights 
to direct their children’s education—to instead educate their 
adolescent children in the arts and skills of Amish life.104 The Court 
acknowledged that a “State’s interest in universal education, however 
highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it 
impinges on fundamental rights and interests,” but the Court said 
that the claimed parents’ rights merited consideration only “so long 
as they . . . ‘prepare [them] for additional obligations.’”105 The Court 
then proceeded to evaluate at considerable length the 200-year-long 
Amish practice of post–elementary school training and its results. 
Following pages of its opinion occupied with this investigation, the 
Court concluded as follows:  
 
97. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
98. Id. at 256–57.  
99. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
100. Id. at 372. 
101. Id. at 389 (Black, J., dissenting) (objecting to the expansion of due process). 
102. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
103. Id. at 207.  
104. Id. at 208–12. 
105. Id. at 214 (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535) (emphasis added).  
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However, the evidence adduced by the Amish in this case 
is persuasively to the effect that an additional one or two years 
of formal high school for Amish children in place of their long-
established program of informal vocational education would do 
little to serve those [state] interests. Respondents’ experts 
testified at trial, without challenge, that the value of all 
education must be assessed in terms of its capacity to prepare 
the child for life. It is one thing to say that compulsory 
education for a year or two beyond the eighth grade may be 
necessary when its goal is the preparation of the child for life in 
modern society as the majority live, but it is quite another if the 
goal of education be viewed as the preparation of the child for 
life in the separated agrarian community that is the keystone of 
the Amish faith. 
The State attacks respondents’ position as one fostering 
“ignorance” from which the child must be protected by the 
State. No one can question the State’s duty to protect children 
from ignorance but this argument does not square with the facts 
disclosed in the record. Whatever their idiosyncrasies as seen by 
the majority, this record strongly shows that the Amish 
community has been a highly successful social unit within our 
society, even if apart from the conventional “mainstream.” Its 
members are productive and very law-abiding members of 
society; they reject public welfare in any of its usual modern 
forms. The Congress itself recognized their self-sufficiency by 
authorizing exemption of such groups as the Amish from the 
obligation to pay social security taxes. 
. . . . 
. . . The Amish alternative to formal secondary school education 
has enabled them to function effectively in their day-to-day life 
under self-imposed limitations on relations with the world, and 
to survive and prosper in contemporary society as a separate, 
sharply identifiable and highly self-sufficient community for 
more than 200 years in this country. In itself this is strong 
evidence that they are capable of fulfilling the social and 
political responsibilities of citizenship without compelled 
attendance beyond the eighth grade at the price of jeopardizing 
their free exercise of religious belief.106 
By contrast with Yoder, recent same-sex marriage opinions have 
failed nearly entirely to take up the question of parents’ duties to 
children, let alone as the framework for evaluating the advisability of 
granting marriage recognition affording same-sex partners new rights 
respecting children.   
106. Id. at 222–25 (footnote and citation omitted). 
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At the same time, same-sex couples never invited the courts to do 
so. They never claimed that they sought marriage as an important 
means of satisfying duties to children. This distinguishes same-sex 
couples from the parent-plaintiffs who preceded them in cases like 
Yoder, who were asking the Court for rights respecting children in 
contested situations while simultaneously delineating and embracing 
their preexisting duties toward children. 
I turn now to the matter of how marriage recognition will result 
in same-sex couples gaining a variety of additional rights over 
children, even while those seeking same-sex marriage rights insist that 
state marriage recognition laws have nothing whatsoever to do with 
children’s procreation or their well-being, except insofar as any 
children presently residing in same-sex-partner homes might indirectly 
benefit from the adult partners’ gaining marriage recognition.107  
There are numerous possible ways for this result to occur. First, it 
is already apparent that legalizing same-sex marriage is increasing the 
number of same-sex couples seeking children via assisted reproductive 
technologies.108 There is also little doubt that a reproductive 
technology clinic’s refusal to offer services to a married same-sex 
couple would be challenged as sexual orientation discrimination. This 
has already been confirmed in California.109  
Furthermore, the “paternity” presumption—previously used to 
assure legal fatherhood to a husband married to a woman who gave 
birth during or shortly after a marriage—is also being extended to the 
same-sex partner of a biological parent of a child.110 Adoption will also 
be more available to legally married same-sex couples via adoption 
agencies required to recognize same-sex marriage in the states in 
which they operate.111  
 
107. See, e.g., Trial Mem., supra note 28, at 6–7.  
108. Michael Cook, The Link Between Rented Wombs and Gay Marriage, 
New Media Found.: MERCATORNET (July 19, 2012), http://www.
mercatornet.com/articles/view/the_link_between_rented_wombs_and
_gay_marriage [hereinafter Cook, Rented Wombs] (reporting an Indian 
surrogacy clinic’s account that it has “seen an increase in the number of 
gay couples and single men approaching our clinic as soon as legitimacy 
to their public union is granted in their respective states or country” 
and noting that “[a] leading US infertility doctor . . . told BioEdge he 
got a surge of inquiries whenever a jurisdiction legalised gay marriage”). 
109. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Superior 
Court, 189 P.3d 959, 970 (Cal. 2008).  
110. See, e.g., In re Parental Responsibilities of A.R.L., 318 P.3d 581, 582 
(Colo. App. 2013) (“[I]n the context of a same-sex relationship, a child 
may have two legal mothers . . . .”).  
111. See Laurie Goodstein, Bishops Drop Program Over Bias Rule, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 29, 2011, at A16. 
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The family law categories of de facto or psychological-parent are 
already employed to extend custody and visitation to same-sex 
partners associated with a child’s conception or child rearing.112 This 
might apply also to gay or lesbian adults living with children born to 
their same-sex partner during a former heterosexual relationship by 
virtue of co-residence and the gaining of informal authority respecting 
such children’s day-to-day existence.113  
Despite these many new opportunities for the exercise of parental 
rights by married same-sex partners, judges approving same-sex 
marriage have devoted scant attention, if any, to the matter of 
parental duties, and then only in response to states’ insistence that 
states possess a legitimate interest in preserving child rearing within a 
related family. The Windsor Court, having ignored the possibility 
that children generally form any part of states’ interests in marriage, 
did not engage the matter of same-sex couples’ duties to children in 
any manner whatsoever.114 And, in the state supreme court opinions 
approving same-sex marriage, judges found that same-sex parents 
were satisfying their duties to children without engaging in anything 
like a thorough Yoder-like analysis of parents’ duties.115 Sometimes, in 
fact, a state court would instead rely heavily on the admission of a 
state attorney general or a nonexpert state witness that same-sex 
couples were doing a good job rearing the children in their 
 
112. See, e.g., In re H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (noting that, 
in considering whether visitation is in the best interest of the child, a child 
of a nontraditional adult relationship “needs and deserves the protection of 
the courts as much as a child of a dissolving traditional relationship”). 
113. Cf. Judith Wallerstein & Julia M. Lewis, Sibling Outcomes and 
Disparate Parenting and Stepparenting After Divorce: Report from a 
10-Year Longitudinal Study, 24 Psychoanalytic Psychol. 445, 452 
(2007) (finding that stepparents “could and did exercise a powerful, 
often decisive, influence” on a biological parent’s decisions regarding 
children from a previous marriage). 
114. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694–95 (2013) (discussing 
children only in the context of claims that they are humiliated and 
suffer financial harm as a result of DOMA).  
115. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt. 1999) (noting only in passing and 
without analyzing the quality of parenting that “there is no dispute that 
a significant number of children today are actually being raised by 
same-sex parents”). The Baker court only broached the topic of quality 
of parenting, briefly and without explicitly mentioning parental duties, 
when it addressed the government’s claim that opposite-sex parents 
provided the optimal setting for child rearing. Id. at 884–85. 
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households116—as if such an admission could substitute for an expert 
analysis of a notoriously complex area.117  
On other occasions, judges relied on studies issued by partisans, 
based on widely acknowledged insufficient or erroneous research 
methods.118 Alternatively, a judge might assert consensus on the 
quality of same-sex parenting,119 although it is eminently clear that 
the matter remains hotly empirically contested.120 In no case creating 
a right to same-sex marriage was there a thorough analysis of the 
relevant literature, or even the appearance of reasoned language about 
the need for caution or the passage of time to allow the development 
of a more complete research literature regarding the well-being of 
children reared in same-sex adults’ households.  
B. Same-Sex Marriage as an Indirect Benefit to Children? 
There is a second aspect of the constitutional law guiding parents’ 
rights respecting children that underwent modification in the cases 
creating same-sex marriage. While prior Supreme Court decisions 
presumed that children’s welfare was a direct product of adults’ 
satisfaction of their duties toward children, cases approving same-sex 
marriage have speculated that children will benefit indirectly from the 
state granting rights (that is, marriage recognition) to the petitioning 
adults. This is a corollary of courts assuming that the difficulties 
 
116. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 963 
(Mass. 2003) (relying in part on the fact that “the department readily 
concedes that people in same-sex couples may be ‘excellent’ parents”).  
117. The question of the success in child rearing between different types of 
parents is a complex question that should be based on an intensive 
factual analysis. See, e.g., Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) 
Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66 Am. Soc. Rev. 159, 
164–67 (2001) (discussing the difficulties inherent in studying same-sex 
parenting, including definitional problems and the vast experiences of 
same-sex couples and their children).  
118. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 899 (Iowa 2009) (noting 
summarily that the government lacked “reliable scientific studies” to 
support its claim that “dual-gender parenting is the optimal environment 
for children” and instead finding persuasive the “abundance of evidence 
and research, confirmed by [the court’s] independent research, supporting 
the proposition that the interests of children are served equally by same-
sex parents and opposite-sex parents”). 
119. Id. at 899 n.26 (“The research appears to strongly support the conclusion 
that same-sex couples foster the same wholesome environment as 
opposite-sex couples and suggests that the traditional notion that 
children need a mother and a father to be raised into healthy, well-
adjusted adults is based more on stereotype than anything else.”). 
120. See, e.g., Baker, 744 A.2d at 884 (noting that, regarding the comparison 
of opposite-sex and same-sex parenting, “child-development experts 
disagree and the answer is decidedly uncertain”). 
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experienced by children living in same-sex partner households flow 
from governmental and social mistreatment of their parents or 
household and not from their family structure itself. This leads such 
courts to presume that granting the adult partners rights to marriage 
will cause trickle-down economic and social benefits for children. In 
short, outsiders are assigned more of the responsibility for children’s 
welfare, while the adults rearing them are assigned less than in prior  
relevant law.  
By way of contrast, Part II.A included a discussion indicating 
that when parents ask for rights to make controversial decisions 
regarding their children, the Supreme Court asked first whether 
granting parents such rights would assist them in fulfilling their duties 
to serve the best interests of children as these were promoted by the 
relevant law. Only when the Court was satisfied that granting rights 
to parents would allow the adults to directly serve the children in line 
with their prescribed duties were the rights given. Thus parents were 
allowed to send their children to religious schools that met certain 
criteria for adequacy, to teach their children in a foreign language in 
addition to English instruction in school, or to train their children in 
manual labor and community mores for an adult future in which 
manual labor and community mores would play crucial roles in their 
ability to support themselves and their family.  
In same-sex marriage recognition cases, on the other hand, courts 
gave rights to parents not in order to serve their children directly121 
but, first and foremost, to give the parents what the court believed to 
constitute emotional happiness or liberty or equality. As a secondary 
matter, courts would often make the unexamined assumption that the 
children would benefit indirectly from a flow of state-provided 
economic benefits and social recognition for the household. This new 
approach to considering child welfare is impoverished in several ways.  
First, it is quite possible that no matter what federal or state law 
holds, third parties will not regard children living in same-sex couple 
households any differently—in ways that will boost children’s well-
being—when the adults are legally married to one another. Social 
mores have a life of their own. Abortion has been legal for over forty 
years, but it is still taboo as a subject of conversation.122 Observers 
who have deep philosophical, practical, or religious objections to 
same-sex partnerships or parenting might, in fact, be more, not less, 
resistant to same-sex households when living within a legal framework 
 
121. Indeed, the plaintiffs insisted that marriage recognition rights are wholly 
unrelated to the presence or absence of children. See supra note 107 and 
accompanying text. 
122. See Sydney Lupkin, Abortion 40 Years After Roe v. Wade, ABC 
NEWS, (Jan. 18, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/roe-wade-abortion
-america-40-years/story?id=18242770.  
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recognizing same-sex marriage and requiring various public and 
private actors to do the same.123  
Furthermore, current literature has shown that marriage is 
associated with tax and other economic liabilities,124 not merely 
advantages. So if, for example, some same-sex parents suffer a tax-
related “marriage penalty,” then by the logic of the courts’ opinions, 
the children in their households are penalized too.  
Additionally, as detailed in Part I, same-sex marriage recognition 
will not affect the family status of the vast majority of children now 
being reared in same-sex couple environments because they already 
have legally recognized opposite-sex parents.125 Their legal parents, 
mother and father, will continue to reside in different places and 
remain unmarried to one another. It is, therefore, quite difficult to see 
how marriage recognition for the two adults with whom these children 
live some or much of the time will elevate their sense of family 
“integrity and closeness” as Windsor surmises.126  
Finally, same-sex marriage opinions impoverish family law’s 
concern for child welfare by assigning the state and society more 
responsibility for children’s flourishing while downplaying parents’ 
responsibilities. Not only are the benefits hypothesized to flow to 
children from the state and society uncertain, but prior attempts to 
hand the state more responsibility for children have regularly failed. 
Foster care is but one example.127 One should also consider policies 
about matters like the availability of ART without prior human or 
 
123. At least one commentator has argued that the reason Justices Breyer, 
Kagan, and Ginsburg found no standing in Perry was to avoid the 
public backlash that would result from constitutional protections for 
same-sex marriage. See Nancy Scherer, Viewing the Supreme Court’s 
Marriage Cases Through a Political Science Lens, 64 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 1131 (2014). This public-backlash theory cuts directly against any 
judicial assertion that children of same-sex marriage households would 
indirectly benefit from recognition of same-sex marriage. 
124. Martha M. Hamilton, Gay Couples Weigh Financial Rewards of 
Marriage, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2013, at G1; Mark R. Randall, 
Married Same-Sex Couples with Kids May See Higher Taxes, EZINE 
ARTICLES (Aug. 19, 2013), http://ezinearticles.com/?Married-Same-
Sex-Couples-With-Kids-May-See-Higher-Taxes&id=7945227.  
125. See supra note 62 and accompanying text; see also DAPHNE LOFQUIST, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SAME-SEX COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS: AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY SURVEY BRIEFS 2–3 & tbl.2 (2011) (showing 84.1% of same-
sex households, including both married and unmarried, had at least one 
child from birth, marriage (stepchild), or adoption). 
126. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013). 
127. Theo Liebmann, What’s Missing from Foster Care Reform? The Need 
for Comprehensive, Realistic, and Compassionate Removal Standards, 
28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 141 (2006) (describing the failure of 
the current foster care system to truly protect and provide for children). 
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animal safety testing or systematic inquiry concerning the 
psychological welfare of children parented by anonymous donors.128 
Another matter for consideration is no-fault divorce without 
safeguards for families that include minor children.129 Thus, the state 
has not shown itself willing or demonstrably able to take on the needs 
of a large number of diverse children. Previous assumptions that 
children might benefit, or at least would not be hurt, when one or 
both of the biological parents were removed from the scene (such as 
with divorce and ARTs), or when their biological parents were not 
married to one another (such as with cohabitation and single 
parenting), have proved hasty and incorrect. Cynics might point out 
that this might be due to the fact that children neither vote nor 
contribute to political campaigns, and therefore laws and lawmakers 
are not effectively judged or governed by how the state takes care of 
children. No matter the reason, however, considering biological 
families’ common and superior willingness to invest in their children130 
 
128.  See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, The Clone Age: Adventures in the 
New World of Reproductive Technology 207–21 (1999) 
(“Everywhere I look, new reproductive and genetic technologies are 
being offered, without sufficient thought about their impact or 
desirability.”); The Anonymous Us Project 29–34 (Alana S. Newman 
ed., 2013) (presenting themes from stories shared anonymously by 
people who were conceived by sperm or egg donation); Jennifer J. 
Kurinczuk & Carol Bower, Birth Defects in Infants Conceived by 
Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection: An Alternative Interpretation, 
315 BRIT. MED. J. 1260, 1262 (1997) (concluding that children born 
after intracytoplasmic sperm injection were, with statistical significance, 
twice as likely to have to have a major birth defect).  
129. See Elizabeth Marquardt, Between Two Worlds: The Inner 
Lives of Children of Divorce 91 (2005) (“Perhaps the most 
significant moral decision many children of divorce have to make . . . is 
the choice between [their] parents.”); Andrew Root, Children of 
Divorce: The Loss of Family as the Loss of Being 23 (2010) 
(“[There is] a problem that we have yet to solve, one that with the rise 
of no-fault divorces has affected millions of people. When the two selves 
are allowed to depart the union when there is no longer love, the 
product of this love, the children, who need the family in order to 
understand themselves, are left without it.” (footnote omitted)); Judith 
Wallerstein et al., The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce: 
A 25 Year Landmark Study, at xxii (2000) (“If the truth be told . . . 
the history of divorce in our society [including the development of no-
fault divorce] is replete with unwarranted assumptions that adults have 
made about children simply because such assumptions are congenial to 
adult needs and wishes.”). 
130. Cf. Simon M. Laham et al., Darwinian Grandparenting: Preferential 
Investment in More Certain Kin, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 63, 63 (2005) (“Because differing levels of genetic relatedness 
between individuals have been recurrent selective forces over human 
evolutionary history, psychological adaptations are hypothesized to have 
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and the fact that the state has not previously succeeded in prioritizing 
children’s interests or in securing investment into children by non-
relatives, the same-sex marriage cases were unwise to shift 
responsibility for children onto third parties and the state.  
For all of these reasons, same-sex marriage recognition cases 
represent an important break with prior family law’s standards and 
methods for protecting children, as articulated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court prior to Windsor. Under the terms of this new, adult-centric 
marriage dispensation, all children, including children living in 
married, same-sex households, are less visible and less important 
relative to adults. They are also less empowered to make demands on 
adults or the state than they were in the past.  
III. Ending the Inquiry About Children’s Welfare and 
Same-Sex Marriage Just as It Is Beginning in Earnest 
This Part suggests that courts’ recognizing same-sex marriage are 
putting an end to the legal inquiry about children’s welfare in 
connection with same-sex marriage, just as the substantive inquiry 
among scholars, experts, and members of the public appears to be 
getting underway in earnest. In this way, the legal path charted by 
same-sex marriage has a great deal in common with the path taken 
by divorce law131 and the law (really the failure to legislate) 
concerning ARTs,132 where systematic inquiry into related harms for 
children took place only years after widespread changes in family law. 
More than a few developments suggest that this pattern is repeating 
itself where same-sex marriage is concerned.  
A. Examples of the Incomplete Inquiry 
First, the first nationally representative studies about children 
reared in same-sex households were only published in 2012 in the 
United States133 and in 2013 Canada.134 They raise important 
questions about emotional, familial, educational, and other outcomes 
for children reared in same-sex households, suggesting that children in 
such households suffer disadvantages overall as compared with 
 
evolved to regulate investment in accordance with reliable cues to 
genetic relatedness.”). 
131. See, e.g., Alvaré, supra note 53. 
132. Id. 
133. Douglas W. Allen, High School Graduation Rates Among Children of 
Same-Sex Households, 11 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 635, 638–39 (2013) 
(discussing how the study addressed the shortcomings of previous same-
sex parenting studies). 
134. Regnerus, supra note 62, at 755 (discussing the highlights of the study 
design compared to others). 
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children raised with their biological parents in intact marriages.135 
Whether these disadvantages spring from children’s experiences of 
familial separation and instability in same-sex households, or other 
factors, is not known with certainty. More research is required. 
Simultaneously, there is appearing for the first time in the United 
States thoughtful, detailed, first-person accounts of distress 
experienced by children reared in same-sex households who labor 
under the hesitation of hurting the adults they also love.136 
Second, data indicating higher rates of instability among same-sex 
couples are emerging as an important mediator of child outcomes in 
its own right.137 Studies from the Netherlands, in addition to the 
studies from the United States and Canada, indicate that instability 
is a factor for children living in same-sex households in three ways. 
First, some report that adults in same-sex partnerships are more 
likely to pursue multiple sexual relationships while in an established 
same-sex union.138 Second, one report suggests that same-sex couples 
are also more likely to dissolve their unions as compared with 
opposite-sex unions,139 with female couples being dramatically less  
135. Allen, supra note 133, at 639 (concluding that children living in same-
sex homes are significantly less likely to graduate high school); 
Regnerus, supra note 62, at 761 tbl.2 (demonstrating that children of 
several family situations fare significantly less well than children of 
currently intact, biological families on several measures). 
136. See, e.g., Robert Oscar Lopez, Growing Up With Two Moms: The 
Untold Children’s View, PUB.\DISCOURSE (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www. 
thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/08/6065 (detailing the confusion and pain 
experienced by a child living in a same-sex household).  
137. Cf. Paula Fomby & Andrew J. Cherlin, Family Instability and Child 
Well-Being, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 181, 199 (2007) (“[C]ognitive 
development [is] weakly associated with family structure instability 
when mothers’ antecedent characteristics are accounted for, while 
children’s behavior may be causally related to instability[.]”). 
138. See Maria Xiridou, et al., The Contribution of Steady and Casual 
Partnerships to the Incidence of HIV Infection Among Homosexual Men 
in Amsterdam, 17 AIDS 1029, 1030–32 (2003) (extrapolating 
mathematically from a prospective cohort study of homosexual men 
younger than thirty years and estimating for purposes of an HIV/AIDS 
transmission model that “men with a steady partner acquire casual 
partners” at a rate of eight per year); Mark Brennan Rosenberg, Are 
Gay Men Scared of Monogamy?, HuffPost Gay Voices (Dec. 6, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-brennan-rosenberg/are-gay-men-
scared-of-monogamy_b_4377924.html?utm_hp_ref=gay-voices (opining 
on the perceived high frequency of multiple external sexual partnerships 
among gay couples).  
139. Gunnar Andersson et al., Divorce-Risk Patterns in Same-Sex “Marriages” in 
Norway and Sweden 16 (Nov. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.uni-koeln.de/wiso-fak/fisoz/conference/papers/p_andersson.pdf 
(finding divorce rates among male same-sex couples fifty percent higher 
than among heterosexual couples). 
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stable140 although they have been shown more likely to have children 
in their households.141 Third, because the majority of children reared 
in same-sex households come from a preexisting heterosexual 
relationship between one of the same-sex partners and an opposite-sex 
partner,142 the shift into a same-sex partner household represents a 
significant transition in the children’s lives. 
Third, a recently published volume of essays by leading experts 
on gender and parenting contains findings indicating that fathers and 
mothers make unique contributions to children, not only overlapping 
ones.143 It also contained an essay by one of the most prominent 
scholars of fatherhood, Professor Ross Parke.144 There he concluded 
that children appear to benefit from sex-differentiated parenting 
styles.145 Professor Parke hypothesized that while it is theoretically 
possible that same-sex couples could deliver such parenting, more 
time and more research would be required to find out but would also 
be exceedingly difficult to produce.146 He also stated that researchers 
in the area of gender and parenting have not even begun to 
investigate systematically what men and women together bring to 
children via their natural “complementarity.”147 Further regarding the 
matter of complementarity, at the end of 2013, a well-regarded study 
showed markedly different brain patterns between males and females, 
potentially affecting not only their individual but also their 
interacting or complementary behaviors.148 Courts creating same-sex 
 
140. See id. (finding that divorce risk in female same-sex couples is about 
double that of male same-sex couples). 
141. APA Policy Statement: Sexual Orientation, Parents, & Children, Am. 
Psychol. Ass’n (July 28 & 30, 2004), http://www.apa.org/about/policy/
parenting.aspx (“In the 2000 U.S. Census, 33% of female same-sex 
couple households and 22% of male same-sex couple households reported 
at least one child under the age of 18 living in the home.”). 
142. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
143. David J. Eggebeen, Do Fathers Uniquely Matter for Adolescent Well-
Being?, in GENDER AND PARENTHOOD: BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIETAL 
SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES 249 (W. Bradford Wilcox & Kathleen 
Kovner Kline eds., 2013). 
144.  Ross D. Parke, Gender Differences and Similarities in Parental Behavior, 
in GENDER AND PARENTHOOD, supra note 143, at 120. 
145. Id. at 133 (reviewing studies that “examine the relative merits of family 
arrangements in which there is either little differentiation between the 
styles of parents of different genders or marked differences in parental 
style” and finding that children from differentiated families fared better 
with regard to social interactions).  
146. Id. at 147–50. 
147. Id. at 134. 
148. Madhura Ingalhalikar et al., Sex Differences in the Structural 
Connectome of the Human Brain, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 823, 
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marriage have given shallow or no treatment to the question of 
children’s possible need for sex-differentiated parenting. Newly 
available evidence suggests they have acted precipitously. 
Fourth, research is also newly available regarding whether 
children reared in divided families suffer due to external influences—
for example, social disapproval—or, rather, internal factors arising 
from their family structures.149 In a recent U.S. study, researchers 
measuring children’s educational and psychological outcomes in both 
externally “high-tolerance” and externally “low-tolerance” social 
environments found that, no matter the external context, children 
living outside married, biological-parenting families experience more 
difficult emotional and social lives.150 This is directly relevant to the 
speculations of courts approving same-sex marriage, which regularly 
suggest that legalizing same-sex marriage would benefit children by 
means of garnering external social support for the relationship of the 
adults rearing them.151 
Fifth, issues specific to same-sex parenting are just beginning to 
surface and generate discussion. These issues include the particular 
difficulties experienced by some lesbian partners over sharing the 
maternal role that leads to poor consequences for stability and 
parenting.152 There is also a growing amount of commentary by gay 
 
823 (2014) (“The developmental trajectories of males and females 
separate at a young age, demonstrating wide differences during 
adolescence and adulthood. The observations suggest that male brains 
are structured to facilitate connectivity between perception and 
coordinated action, whereas female brains are designed to facilitate 
communication between analytical and intuitive processing modes.”).  
149. D. Paul Sullins, Child Emotional Problems in Non-Traditional Families 
(Oct. 3, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Case Western 
Reserve Law Review). 
150. Id. at 19–22; see also Astrid Wurtz Rasmussen, Family Structure and 
Children’s Health, Behavior, and Educational Outcomes 21–29 (Aarhaus 
Univ., Working Paper No. 09-15, 2010), available at 
http://www.hha.dk/nat/wper/09-15_awu.pdf (detailing the difficulties 
borne by children growing up in single-parent households or 
experiencing family-structure changes).  
151. For a discussion on courts that have claimed indirect benefit courts have 
claimed same-sex marriage recognition will have on children, see 
discussion supra Part II.B.  
152. See Mari Herreras, The Other Mom: A Fight for Equal Custody Is an 
Example of Why Marriage Equality in Arizona Is Needed Now, TUCSON 
WKLY., June 27–July 3, 2013, at 12 (describing a lesbian mother’s 
custody battle for her nonbiological son). Fertility clinics have come up 
with some innovations allowing both mothers to take part in the 
biological process by implanting one mother’s eggs into the other mother. 
See Marilynn Marchione, Fertility Clinics Help More Gay Couples Have 
Children, Sunday Capital (Annapolis, Md.), Oct. 20, 2013, at D4 (“‘It 
allowed us both to participate,’ Sarah Marshall said. ‘I had to mentally 
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men about the increased pressure they feel—from their peers in the 
gay community and from their families—to obtain children in order to 
appear as fully legitimate married couples, equal in every respect to 
opposite-sexed couples.153 This phenomenon, in addition to some gay 
men’s personal hopes for parenting, is leading a rising demand for 
surrogate mothers,154 despite all of the moral hazards surrogacy 
intrinsically raises.155 These include the “physical and psychological 
risks” suffered by the surrogates,156 the documented income and racial 
gaps between buyers and sellers in the surrogacy market,157 and even 
evidence that some percentage of reproductive trafficking can now be 
linked to surrogacy.158 
Sixth and finally, the past few years have witnessed a surge of 
reports and first-person narratives about the experience of donor-
 
and psychologically give up the idea of, is she going to look like me or my 
family. But from the time I started carrying her up to now, she is 
definitely mine.’”). 
153. See Rachel Swarns, Male Couples Face Pressure to Fill Cradles, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2012, at A1 (“But some gay men who have no plans to 
have children view the shift [in public opinion supporting same-sex 
parenting] as something of a mixed blessing. On one hand, they welcome 
the sense of inclusion that comes with always being asked about children. 
On the other hand, they are always being asked about children.”).  
154. Marchione, supra note 152; Frances Fang Le & Du Liya, Surrogacy 
Industry Sees Boom in U.S., GLOBAL TIMES (Dec. 11, 2013, 
1:23 PM), http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/831475/
Surrogacy-industry-sees-boom-in-US.aspx.  
155. See Andrews, supra note 128, at 103–22 (discussing some of the issues 
that can arise in surrogacy arrangements); see, e.g., Breeders: A 
Subclass of Women? (The Center for Bioethics and Culture 2014), 
available at http://breeders.cbc-network.org (featuring surrogate 
mothers who tell about their experiences with surrogacy). 
156. See id. at 108 (“‘Surrogacy does present potential psychological and 
physical risks to the women involved,’ says surrogate mother . . . . ‘But 
generally our society has allowed people to undertake potentially risky 
activities so long as they have given voluntary consent.’”).  
157. See, e.g., Byrn Williams-Jones, Commercial Surrogacy and the 
Redefinition of Motherhood, 2 J. PHIL., SCI. & LAW (Feb. 2002), 
http://jpsl.org/archives/commercial-surrogacy-and-redefinition-mother
hood/ (detailing the wide disparity of income between the 
commissioning couple and the surrogate); Daisy Deomampo, Transna-
tional Surrogacy in India: Interrogating Power and Women’s Agency, 
34 FRONTIERS 167, 183–84 (2013) (discussing the rise of surrogacy in 
India as a means of supplementing working-class income and the impact 
on both surrogate mothers and their families).  
158. See Hedva Eyal, Genewatch: Reproductive Trafficking, COUNCIL FOR 
RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/
genewatch/GeneWatchPage.aspx?pageId=313 (last visited Mar. 11, 2014).  
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conceived children.159 It is impossible to miss the gap between the 
stories told on sites such as AnonymousUs.org, about the longing for 
kin, for identity, and for a family history,160 and the cheerful, 
idealistic, or even “right-to-a-child” material on gay-advocacy 
websites touting surrogacy such as ItsConceivableNow.com.161 
B. Altering Children’s Existential Situation and Sense of Self 
A final reflection on the matter of same-sex marriage and children 
concerns the way same-sex marriage potentially alters children’s 
existential situation, in the sense that their experience of themselves 
and their place in their family and society are at stake. It seems 
possible to observe generally that children living in same-sex partner 
households are, ontologically speaking, less “received” or “gifted” into 
the household than they are gotten—gotten via contract, negotiation, 
technology, or even a legal action against a former opposite-sex 
partner. In opposite-sex households, the hand of nature, God, or 
whatever the couple chooses to call the creative order, is more 
obviously at work, thus making the child more incrementally or more 
clearly “received” than “obtained,” more “gifted” than “gotten.” 
Experience and research demonstrate the importance of children’s 
emotional environment as a factor in their development.162 There is 
literature on this subject in connection with adoption,163 ARTs,164 and 
 
159. See, e.g., Anonymous Us Project, supra note 129 at 29–34; 
Elizabeth Marquardt et al., Inst. for Am. Values, My Daddy’s 
Name Is Donor: A New Study of Young Adults Conceived 
Through Sperm Donation (2010); see also Stories from Donor 
Conceived, AnonymousUs.org, http://anonymousus.org/stories/index.
php#.UvaZXHnZVg0 (last visited Mar. 11, 2014) (detailing through 
blog postings the experiences of donor conceived children). 
160. AnonymousUs.org, supra note 159. 
161. It’s Conceivable: The Path to Parenting Isn’t Always Straight, 
http://itsconceivablenow.com (last visited Mar. 11, 2014). 
162. See, e.g., T. BERRY BRAZELTON & STANLEY I. GREENSPAN, THE 
IRREDUCIBLE NEEDS OF CHILDREN: WHAT EVERY CHILD MUST HAVE 
TO GROW, LEARN, AND FLOURISH, at x (2000) (“Early childhood is 
both the most critical and the most vulnerable time in any child’s 
development. . . . [I]n the first few years, the ingredients for intellectual, 
emotional, and moral growth are laid down.”); ERIK H. ERIKSON, 
IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS 158–61 (1968) (describing how a child’s 
relationships and experiences at different ages affect that child’s 
developing identity); HARVILLE HENDRIX, GETTING THE LOVE YOU 
WANT: A GUIDE FOR COUPLES 15–34 (20th ann. ed. 2008) (linking 
childhood experiences to expectations in adult relationships). 
163. See Sharon Vandivere et al., Adoption USA: Summary and Highlights of 
a Chartbook on the National Survey of Adoptive Parents, Adoption 
Advocate, Mar. 2010, at 9 (“[T]he majority of adopted children far[e] 
well on measures of physical health, social and emotional well-being, 
cognitive development, and educational achievement. . . . [Compared to] 
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child custody actions.165 It is even part of the literature about children 
whose siblings were aborted while they were not.166 
Children living in same-sex partner households experience 
particular environmental factors. They are in every case, severed from 
their kin network, missing one or both genealogical parents, siblings, 
and extended family. They were never brought into being by an act of 
sexual intimacy or love between the married adults living in their 
household, which then links them with a preexisting network of 
family, on both sides, with their own histories, cultures, and religions.  
Same-sex marriage recognition cases, with their insistence that 
same-sex parenting is not different in any important way from 
opposite-sex parenting, neglect these existential realities. Of course, 
not every child within an opposite-sex marriage is the result of the 
sexual intimacy of her married mother and father, nor do all children 
within opposite-sex marriages possesses a kin network by reason of 
living in an opposite-sexed household. Some of their parents 
committed adultery, remarried, or employed adoption or ARTs. We 
know, however, that over ninety-one percent of children living in 
opposite-sex married households are biologically related to both of 
their married parents,167 while in same-sex marriages, 100% of children 
are necessarily obtained through methods such as ART, adoption, or 
custody arrangements.  
Volumes have been and could be written about what it means in 
the life of a person to be loved into existence, received as a gift, and 
raised within a web of relations, as distinguished from being gotten or 
desired into being and separated from one’s genealogical kin. A great  
children in the general U.S. population[,] . . . adopted children fare less 
well on certain measures of well-being (e.g., special health care needs, 
diagnose of physiological disorders, and school engagement), [while] they 
fare better than the general population of children on other measures 
(e.g., consistency and adequacy of health insurance, being told stories or 
sung to daily as young children, and participating in family and 
community activities).”); Children’s Bureau, U.S. Dep’t Health 
and Human Servs., IMPACT OF ADOPTION ON ADOPTED PERSONS 2–
8 (2013) (discussing some issues faced by adopted individuals and 
suggesting management strategies); Facts for Families: The Adopted 
Child, AM. ACAD. CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, Mar. 2011, 
at 1–2 (“All adolescents go through a stage of struggling with their 
identity, wondering how they fit in with their family, their peers, and the 
rest of the world . . . . [T]he adopted child is likely to have an increased 
interest in his or her birth parents.”). 
164. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
165. See WALLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 129, at 205–22.  
166. Philip G. Ney, A Consideration of Abortion Survivors, 13 CHILD 
PSYCHIATRY AND HUMAN DEV. 168, 171–75 (1983).  
167. ROSE KREIDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ADOPTED CHILDREN AND 
Stepchildren: 2000, at 14 (2003).  
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deal is contained in the material referenced within this Article in 
which children reared in the contexts of anonymous168 or separated169 
parents, or parents more consumed with their own identity 
struggles,170 express their existential sufferings and questions. They 
wonder openly about their cultural and personal identity and about 
whether they are loved or worthy of love.171 What might be some of 
the additional implications of this new situation of children raised by 
same-sex parents? 
Various implications might be deduced, beginning from the 
reflections of the French philosopher Marcel Gauchet in his apt and 
well-known essay “Les Enfants du Désir” (Children of Desire).172 
Gauchet proposes that adults rearing children in such environments 
might easily understand themselves less as stewards of children, or in 
service of their growth and emancipation, and more as proprietors. 
After all, the adults labored, spent, waited, and negotiated under 
stressful conditions in order to obtain these children’s birth and 
presence in the household. This disposition is obviously related to the 
possibility that children in same-sex households will experience 
pressure to be something in particular,173 a standard-bearer of some 
kind, a potential vindicator of the adults’ unconventional choices. 
Conversations about children on gay blogs, for example, often refer to 
the children as “gaybys,” indicating that the child’s very identity is 
about what the parents are.174 One wonders, muses Gauchet, what the 
effects will be on parents’ and children’s willingness to sacrifice for the 
 
168. See, e.g., Anonymous Us Project, supra note 128 at 29–34.  
169. See supra note 129. 
170. See, e.g., Anonymous Us Project, supra note 128, at 29–34; Elizabeth 
Marquardt et al., Inst. for Am. Values, My Daddy’s Name Is Donor: A 
New Study of Young Adults Conceived Through Sperm Donation 
(2010); see also Stories from Donor Conceived, AnonymousUs.org, http: 
//anonymousus.org/stories/index.php#.UvaZXHnZVg0 (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2014) (detailing through blog postings the experiences of donor 
conceived children). 
171. AnonymousUs.org, supra note 160. 
172. Marcel Gauchet, L’Enfant du Désir, 47 CHAMP PSYCHOSOMATIQUE 9 
(2007).  
173. See Same-Sex Couples May Feel Pressure to Raise Heterosexual Kids, 
HEALTH DAY (Sept. 17, 2010), http://consumer.healthday.com/kids-
health-information-23/child-development-news-124/same-sex-couples-may
-feel-pressure-to-raise-heterosexual-kids-643160.html (“Social pressure for 
gay parents to raise heterosexual children can cause stress for these 
families and make it harder for gay children of gay parents to get the 
support they need . . . .”).  
174. See, e.g., April Martin, Issues for Lesbian- and Gay-Parented Families, 
PARENTHOOD IN AMERICA (1998), http://parenthood.library.wisc.edu/ 
Martin/Martin.html. 
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common good, given the possibility that their families understand 
themselves as hard-won, or otherwise special.  
Gauchet even links the phenomenon of “desired” children to the 
possibility of their experiencing difficulty living in an egalitarian 
society containing preexisting “institutions.”175 He suggests that adults 
rearing “desired” children can be seen demanding that each of their 
children be accepted as an entirely individual creature, with special 
needs and gifts, versus one of the vast number of entirely equal 
persons in society.176 Gauchet points out that there have always been, 
and will always be, social institutions with standards to which 
successful participants must rise and conform in order to achieve 
success.177 He also recalls that life is full of circumstances we do not 
choose and that our “individuation” is accomplished not by refusing 
to acknowledge these, but by learning to live with reality, making 
choices toward reaching goals in the face of constraints, and living 
with a willingness to extend, to discipline, and to transform 
ourselves.178 The “child of desire,” he notes, may be raised 
insufficiently capacitated to meet such challenges. Instead of thinking 
“Je suis mon proper auteur” (“I am my own author”), he may believe 
“Je ne suis pas le fruit du hazard, j’ai été désiré comme je suis” (“I 
am not the product of chance, but I was desired as I am”).179  
It is worth noting here that the area of marriage was the last 
corner of family law tying children to the two adults who made them, 
thus preserving conception and child rearing as a sort of gift within 
an act of sexual intimacy and within a network of kin relations. 
Previously, there existed bodies of law penalizing illegitimacy or 
forbidding fornication, cohabitation, and adultery—all of which 
attempted to preserve the interlinking of marriage and childbearing to 
the end of children’s flourishing. For various reasons ranging from 
humanitarian concerns for children to nonenforcement of laws and 
elevated notions of privacy, all of these laws have essentially 
disappeared from the family law landscape. Additionally, ARTs have 
entered the scene, both confounding and rendering anonymous 
formerly basic and socially understood family relationships. Family 
law still has the “paternity presumption,” performing some of the 
work of linking children to married parents, but even that has been 
effaced due to its usage in collaborative reproduction settings 
involving either heterosexual or homosexual couples. 
 
175.  Gauchet, supra note 172, at 12, 17–18. 
176.  Id. at 11, 18.  
177.  Id. at 10. 
178. Id. at 21. 
179. Id. at 22.  
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Thus marriage was the last major area of family law left to 
perform the task of interlinking parents with the children they 
conceive. 
Conclusion 
Current arguments and judicial opinions favoring same-sex 
marriage have entirely neglected over a century of Supreme Court 
opinions linking state marriage recognition with the procreation of 
children and the formation of society itself. Due to their ignoring of 
the links between marriage and children, and ways in which they 
reoriented and recalibrated the relationships between parents, 
children, and the state, these arguments and opinions have weakened 
children’s position in family law. They also raise existential questions 
for the children brought into same-sex marriage households. 
It is ironic that children have been reconceived to their 
disadvantage by means of a struggle over same-sex marriage. For this 
is a struggle in which the movants consistently assured observers that 
marriage had nothing whatsoever to do with children, and in which 
the courts involved dedicated almost no thoughtful attention to the 
welfare of children. Yet the position of children has been affected 
significantly just the same, and not in a positive direction. 
